## 2AC

### AT: Biopolitics Good

No link – the affirmative is a criticism of sovereign power, which is distinct – sovereign power is the power to decide between life and death, while biopower seeks to promote and protect life

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Foucault explains power in depth to his readers. There are five things that he says about power. He says that power is not an object, power is relational, power is productive, and power is intentional. He explains that power can be gained and one way to gain power is by having knowledge. Foucault explains that power is continual and varies. Power is always changing over time. It has matrices of transformation and power is also persuasive. Foucault also says that power operates in a way that helps it reproduce itself. In his piece titled “History of Sexuality,” he tells us about sovereign power. This is the power that gives you the right over the ability to decide between life and death. He also explains that this has turned into the power to expose someone’s life to death. For example, sovereign power could be the power that a president has to send someone to war. He also talks about direct power and indirect power. Direct power is the punishment that a sovereign power is able to enforce. The indirect power is the power that the sovereign power has to expose someone’s life to death. Basically it is the right to take life or let live. One example that I thought of when reading this was our justice system and the death or life sentence. There are some states in our government that have the death sentence. This is the sentence that one receives when they commit a crime so horrible that the judge of that case believes that the criminal deserves to be put to death. In a way, that judge holds sovereign power. He is exercising his right to take a life when he sentences someone to death. He can also exercise his power to let live by sentencing someone to life in prison instead of death. A life sentence is when someone who commits a crime bad enough gets sentenced to spend the rest of their life in prison. Another type of power that Foucault talks about is Biopower. While sovereign power was a way that people in power would take lives, biopower was the exact opposite of that. Biopower is a way that someone can exert complete and total power over someone else. The reason for doing this would be to better promote life. Foucault explains that biopower is needed to protect lives instead of taking them. This transformed the system from the right to take life or let live to the right to foster life. An example that I thought of when reading this was universal health care. Universal healthcare is when a government supplies their whole country with healthcare. With universal health care no one has to pay for health care and no one has to pay for medical services. This is, in a way, the government exercising its right to promote life. If everyone has healthcare and is being taken care of all their medical issues, and the government is paying for it then they are promoting the life of their citizens.

### 2AC Perceptibility

#### The K misreads history – change is the key internal link to progress – also their argument necessitates complicity in evil because any action *could* be coopted – they stick us with the status quo

Trott, 10

Ben Trott, journal newspaper in which to think through, debate and articulate the political, social, economic and cultural theories of our movements, as well as the networks of diverse practices and alternatives that surround them; “Skipping steps,” May 2010, http://www.redpepper.org.uk/Skipping-steps/ //bghs-ms

Second, The Coming Insurrection offers a very one-dimensional reading of history, which derives directly from that of the Situationists. For The Invisible Committee, history is the history of defeat. Or rather, what Debord would call 'recuperation', turning systemic opposition or criticism into something not only controllable, but profitable. Think of the trajectory taken by punk: from a riotous youth movement to the shelves of H&M, via Vivienne Westwood diamond-studded safety pins. This narrative is not incorrect as such, but it is incomplete. The book fails to recognise, for instance, that the precarious, flexible and mobile reality of work today, which it so vividly describes, is in part a result of the earlier rejection of the monotony of the assembly line. This does not mean we should just be happy with our lot. But failing to recognise the role that previous generations' struggles played in shaping the world runs the risk of underestimating the range of possibilities to bring about further changes. It is on the basis of these shortcomings that The Coming Insurrection proposes its strategy for change: an attempt to deploy forms of struggle that cannot be recuperated (as if they existed!), de-linked from the rest of the left, and relatively disinterested in some of the most pressing questions. Such as: where and by whom is social wealth produced today? Or: how can we go about democratically deciding how we want to produce and live in the future? In the current political and economic climate, proposals for a radical remaking of society are an urgent necessity. But in skipping vital questions the book ends up providing a strategy unlikely to bear fruit.

#### Every space has emancipatory potential – their attempt to say otherwise only endorses ideological policing

Springer, ’11 Lecturer at Department of Geography at the University of Otago (Simon Springer, 2011, Antipode, “Public Space as Emancipation: Meditations on Anarchism, Radical Democracy, Neoliberalism and Violence,” Vol. 43 Iss. 2 pp. 525-562)

Radical democracy is a messy process with an inherent uncertainty reflecting the essential agonism of open public discussion concerning community principles, and the possibility of sudden changes, conflicts, and contradictions in collective goals. The spaces of democratic societies must always be in process, constructions to be maintained and repaired as the collective interest is defined and contested (Entrikin 2002). This processual nature of public space explains why it is and must be the subject of continuous contestation, spanning a fluid spectrum between debate, protest, agonism and at times, lamentably antagonism and violence. Accordingly, it is paramount to view public space as a medium allowing for the contestation of power, focusing on issues of “access” ranging from basic use to more complicated matters, including territoriality and symbolic ownership (Atkinson 2003). Public space is never a complete project, but is instead both the product and site of conflict between the competing ideologies of “order” (authoritarianism/archy/representation of space) and “unscripted” interaction (democracy/anarchy/representational space) (Lefebvre 1991; Mitchell 2003b).10 These competing approaches do not result in dichotomous public spaces. Rather, emphasis must be placed on the processual and fluidic character of public space, where any recognizable “outcome” from either the ordered or the unscripted is necessarily temporary, that is, a means without end. Although claiming to advocate democratic public space, Carr et al (1992:xi) exemplify the ordered approach by suggesting public space is “the setting for activities that threaten communities, such as crime and protest”. The ability to protest is what makes public space democratic as it provides those without institutionalized power the opportunity to challenge the status quo. Crime, for its part, is most often conceived in terms of property rights, and accordingly the poor and propertyless are repeatedly cast as transgressors of public space. Hee and Ooi (2003) take a different approach to the ordered view, contending that the public spaces of colonial and post-colonial cities are constructions of the ruling elite. Certainly, colonial administrators and incumbent regimes enforce their representations of space, but this ignores the element of contestation and the possible emergence of representational space. Beijing's Tiananmen Square offers a case in point, as the people took this controlled space, and, although recaptured by the state, it remains ideologically contested in the public sphere, continuing to fire the imagination of social movements

in China and beyond (Lees 1994). Thus, the values embedded in public space are those with which the demos endows it (Goheen 1998), not simply the visualizations and administrations of reigning elites. States, corporations, and IFIs may challenge collectively endowed values and espouse the ordered view because they seek to shape public space in ways that limit the threat of democratic power to dominant socioeconomic interests (Harvey 2000). Although total control over public space is impossible, they do attempt to regulate it by keeping it relatively free of passion (Duncan 1996). To remove the passion from public space, corporate or state planners attempt to create spaces based on a desire for security more than interaction and for entertainment more than democratic politics (Goss 1996), a process Sorkin (1992) calls “the end of public space”. Under the ordered view of public space, premised on a need for surveillance and control over behavior, representations of space come to dominate representational spaces. The processes of increasing surveillance, commodification, and private usage are known in the literature as the “disneyfication” of space, where the urban future looms as a “sanitized, ersatz architecture devoid of geographic specificity” (Lees 1994:446). In this light, the struggle for democracy is inseparable from public space, as where things are said is at least as important as what is said, when it is said, how it is said, and who is saying it. Thus, shielding oneself from political provocation is easily achieved when all the important public gathering places have become highly policed public space, or its corollary, private property (Mitchell 2003a). Relentlessly confronting the arrogation of public space is imperative, because the entrenched power of capital can only be repealed through agonism, whereby a multiplicity of subject positions may be recognized as legitimate claimants to the spaces of the public (Mouffe 2006). When the seemingly everyday, yet “disneyfied” performances of capitalism are ignored as normative values, unexceptional practices, and quotidian sequences they are lent the appearance of insignificance. This is the center of Lefebvre's (1984:24) critique of everyday life, where such taken for granted succession helps to explain why neoliberalism is often understood as an inevitable, monolithic force. Such a view ignores how hegemony, understood in the sense advocated by Laclau and Mouffe (2001), is a discursively constructed strategy, reproduced through “everyday” practices that are often oppressive, yet frequently go unnoticed as such. This suggests that neoliberalism proceeds through a dialectic of coercion and co-optation, which has significant implications for public space. Most often public space is not the site of momentous clashes between archy and demos, but rather a site of mundanity and routinized conduct. Consequently, everyday life as it is mediated through the continual (re)production of space (Lefebvre 1991), is also the terrain in which power is reified, manipulated, and contested (Cohen and Taylor 1992). It is the everyday forms and uses of public space that inform those moments when extraordinary contestation becomes manifest. So while public protests may initially appear limited in scope, they are often expressions of latent dissatisfactions, which in the current moment, are related primarily to the strains of neoliberalism.

### 2AC – FW

#### Their complaint is with the form rather than the content of the 1AC – translating this complaint into a rule plays into sovereign hands which turns decisionmaking and guts education

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(Brent, Defacing Power: The Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics pg 109-111, dml)

The rules of language and speaking can themselves **serve to conceal truth** in world politics. I begin here with the work of Nicholas Onuf (1989), which has inspired constructivists to engage how “language is a rule-governed activity” (Wilmer 2003: 221). Rules help construct patterns and structures of language exchanges, and “without these rules, language becomes meaningless” (Gould 2003: 61). From the work of Onuf, we recognize that rules **do more** than set appropriate boundaries for language, as the ¶ paradigm of political society is aptly named because it links irrevocably the sine qua non of society— the availability, no, the unavoidability of rules— and of politics— the persistence of asymmetric social relations, known otherwise as the condition of rule. (1989: 22) ¶ **Rules lead to rule**— what Onuf (1989) titles the “rule-rules coupling.” Thus, linguistic rules **demarcate relations of power** and serve to **perpetuate the asymmetry** of social relations. The structure of language games is valued because it provides order and continuity. But because those rules are obeyed so **frequently** and **effortlessly**, they are hard to recognize as forms of authority. ¶ Where does the need for such continuity arise? As mentioned in previous chapters, Giddensian sociology suggests that the drive for ontological security, for the securing of self-identity through time, can only be satisfied by the screening out of chaotic everyday events through routines, which are a “central element of the autonomy of the developing individual” (Giddens 1991: 40). Without routines, individuals face chaos, and what Giddens calls the “protective cocoon” of basic trust evaporates (ibid.). Yet, as I have discussed in my other work (2005, 2008a) and as Jennifer Mitzen notes (2006: 364), rigid routines can **constrain agents in their ability to** **learn new information**. This is what the rhythmic strata of aesthetic power satisfies. In the context it creates for parrhesia, these routines, connected to an agent’s sense of Self, **shield that agent from the truth**.4 “The shallowness of our routinized daily existence,” Weber once stated, “consists indeed in the fact that the persons who are caught up in it do not become aware, and above all **do not wish** to become aware, of this partly psychologically, part pragmatically conditioned motley of irreconcilably antagonistic values” (1974: 18). The need for such rhythmic continuity spans all social organizations, including scholarly communities (thus we refer to such communities as “disciplines”). ¶ The function of these rules creates a similar problematic faced by the parrhesiastes who is attempting to “**shock**” these structured rules and habits of the targeted agent. Because the parrhesiastes may find the linguistic rules or at least “styles” or language used by the targeted power to be part of the problem (the notion that one must be “tactful,” for instance), she or he must perform a balancing act between two goals. **First,** the parrhesiastes must **challenge the conventions** that serve to simplify and even conceal the truth the parrhesiastes is speaking. **Second,** the parrhesiastes **must observe** some of these speaking rules, part of which may themselves be responsible for or derivate toward the style of the Self that needs to be challenged by the parrhesiastes. Favoring the first, the parrhesiastes is prone to being ignored as irrational, as someone “on the fringe” or even unintelligible or, in the words of Harry Gould already noted, “meaningless.” Favoring the second moves the parrhesiastes away from the truth attempting to be told or at least obscures the truth with the language of nicety. As developed by Epicurean philosopher Philodemus, parrhesia existed within this spectrum: at times, it bordered on “harsh frankness” that was “not mixed with praise”; at other times, the frankness was more subdued (Glad 1996: 41). 5 As the examples of Cynic and academic-intellectual parrhesia provided later in this chapter illustrate, different manifestations of truth-telling as a form of counterpower occupy different spaces along this spectrum— balancing between abiding by these conventions of decorum and style; the need to provide forceful, decloaked truth; or, in the case of Cynic parrhesia, flauntingly contradicting the conventions altogether. ¶ The parrhesiastes will most likely face charges of the first order (ignoring convention) **regardless of the manner** in which parrhesia is delivered. If, indeed, “the truth hurts” and if the target of such truth cannot deny the facts being delivered, the **most convenient option** for the victim **is to blame** “**the way**” in which the parrhesiastes said something, knowing full well that it was **the substance** of what that person said that was, for the victim, inappropriate or, more to the point, inconvenient.

### AT: Decisionmaking

#### Their claims about portable skills rely on an understanding of education which frames subjects as units of rationality to be bettered through civilizing practices. This form of dispassionate subject construction eliminates care and dooms millions to suffering and death.

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EDUCATION FOR IMPROVEMENT, OR “KICKING THE DOG” Too many lost names too many rules to the game Better find a focus or you’re out of the picture.48 The idea that the fundamental issue of the just civil state is to find the right balance between preserving individual freedom and constraining individual threat has served as a tacit foundation within which belief and debate about educational philosophy, policy, and practice develop. This statement is not intended to suggest that there is some direct and specific historical connection that can be unequivocally demonstrated to exist between foundational political theory and mainstream educational theories and practices. However, I want to propose that there is a compatibility between them that has important consequences for a new critique of organized formal education. In the remainder of this paper, my aim is to argue that the tenor of the theories that I have summarized is endemic in the ordinary ways that we think about and engage in organized education. How is the idea of the basic human being that is posed as the fundamental social, political, and pedagogic problem for modern civilization, this human being that must be managed in order to keep it from harming itself and others, played out in educational presuppositions? The tacit, unchallenged belief is that through education, the human being must be made into something better than it was or would be absent a formal education. There are all kinds of versions of this subject and of what it should become: potential achiever, qualified professional, good citizen, “leader,” independent actor, critical thinker, change agent, knowledgeable person. In all cases, the subject before education is viewed to be, like the subject before civilization, something in need of being made competent—and safe—in the mind of the educator. From this vantage point, the pedagogic relationship between teacher and student, between competent adult and incompetent child ~or adult!, contains within it a possibility that it seeks to overcome, namely, a rejection of the socialization program of the former by the latter. There is an implicit conflict between individuals as soon as the student walks into the school or college classroom door from outside the civility that the teacher would have that student become. It must be resolved, or contained in some way; and this is done immediately by rendering the student a rule follower ~a follower of the social order!both in and out of the classroom. Or the student must be rendered a challenger of the social order, in favor of an order that overcomes oppression—to become a competent comrade. The individual must be taught how to be an individual in accordance with this balance. Being an individual means being “free”—it means being “self-determined,” it means competing, and it means obeying the law. This is the case, even if the teaching is done with kindness and sensitivity. The responsibility for dealing with suffering and limitation lies almost solely with this individual, not the state. In fact, if suffering is viewed at all, it tends to be viewed as something that is good for the individual to endure or to fight in order to overcome it. Limitation is not acknowledged, unless the individual is deemed disadvantaged in some way, and the remedy tends to be to provide the person with an opportunity to become competent. Is it any wonder that parents of children with disabilities, aided by many educators, often must fight for educational and other services? This situation simply reflects that the basic logic of organized formal education and, more generally, the state, is not predicated upon a recognition that the human being is susceptible to suffering or that the state’s reason for being should be to care for people. If caring for its inhabitants were the basic purpose of the civil state, then there would be no need to fight for this recognition. Is it any wonder that the education of the ordinary child is mainly training for a far-off, abstract future that is destined to be better than life at present? Why must school be about overcoming anything? We talk about equipping children and adults to “solve problems.” Yet, problems do not fall from the sky; they do not exist as such until a human being gives them a name. In contrast, the concept of contention suggests that the practical role of reason should be used to understand the human being as subject to suffering and to act accordingly as moral agents. That is very different from an educational philosophy, policy, and practice that views reason as an instrument by which to overcome obstacles and to conform to the social order. It may be argued that modern education is about reason, about how to think and live reasonably and, therefore, how to live well and to care for oneself and for others. Yet it is commonly expressed that we live in a “complex world” and that children and adults must “learn how to learn,” in order to “succeed in a world of rapid change.” The question that needs to be asked is: Why should a person have to? In effect, education expects the human being to have an unlimited ability to think and act with reason sufficient to cope with increasingly complex situations that require individual intellect to adequately recognize, evaluate, and prioritize alternative courses of action, consider their consequences, and make good decisions. For the most part, the increasing complexity of civil society and the multiplicity of factors that intellect is expected to deal with in different situations are not questioned in education. Is this what education is rightly about? Education is as much about the use of intelligence to avoid suffering and feelings of limitation and about fending off feelings of fear as it is about learning. It is about acting upon other people and upon the civil order to deal with perceived threats. One must be an “active learner” or else. Why? The individual must be acted upon and rendered into an entity that engages reality in the ways that are deemed just by many educators, lawmakers, and others with a stake in the perpetuation of the given social order. Thus, the individual is exhorted to “do your best,” “make an effort,” “earn a grade,” “be motivated,” “work hard,” “overcome obstacles,” “achieve.” Why should education be about any of these things? Unfortunately, the culture of scholarship is thoroughly consistent with these precepts. When we question them, we challenge the ends that they serve but not the ideas themselves. We believe that education is rightly about improvement. This philosophy of improvement is not necessarily consistent with enhancement of living. It often has the opposite effect. How is this result justified? Certainly, it can feel good to accomplish something or to overcome obstacles. Does that mean that adversity should be a positive value of the civil state? The modern idea, beginning with Descartes and established through Lockean empiricism ~and made pedagogic by Rousseau’s Emile!, that anyone can be rational leads quickly to the idea that everyone is responsible for being wholly rational, as that word is understood according to the social order. The perpetuation of the given social order in education as elsewhere is about gaining advantage and retaining power. It is about cultural politics and about marginalization of various groups and about class and about socializing children to believe in capitalism as if it is a natural law. Yet under the analysis that I have made here, these major problems are symptoms of something more basic. The more basic problem that I have emphasized here is inextricable from the problem of the just civil state. It is about the intense pressures on people to think and act in ways that serve broader interests that are not at all concerned with their well-being in a variety of contexts including psychological, social, economic, political, and cultural. It is no answer to ground pedagogy in the notion of “building community.” The idea that something must be built implies that something must be made better in order for it to be tolerated. Moreover, “community” carries with it the prerequisite that one be made competent to be a member— again, the presumption that something must be done to the person to make it better in some way. I do not mean to say that educators have bad intent. I do mean that this ethos of betterment through competency will inevitably fail to fulfill the dreams of reformers and revolutionaries. It does not consider the human being as an entity to care for but rather as something to be equipped with skills and knowledge in order to improve itself. This failure is not only because there are millions of children and adults that live in poverty in the wealthiest countries in human history. It is because the state of mind that can tolerate such suffering is the same state that advances and maintains the ethos of civility as betterment, rather than civility as caring for people because they are subject to suffering. The alternative that I have only introduced in a very abbreviated way under the rubric that I called “contention” is intended to be pragmatic in the ways that Foucault and Richard Rorty are pragmatic in their respective approaches to the subject of the state.49 It is intended to address an unacceptable state of contemporary Western civilization, namely, its repetitive and even escalating incidence of disregard for suffering and harm in many forms, despite intellectual, social, medical, legal, educational, scientific, and technological “progress.” We have had two hundred years of modern educational principles, and two hundred years of profound suffering along with them. The problem of the individual calls for a new formulation and for a proper response—one that cares for the individual rather than makes it competent. The “modern project” of betterment through competency and opportunity must be challenged and replaced by an emotionally intelligent ethos that expressly and fundamentally acknowledges suffering and limitation in philosophy, policy, and practice.

### AT: Roleplaying/Simulation

#### You should be an informed citizen, not the government – they shut down critical thinking and deliberation

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(Brent, Defacing Power: The Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics pg 130-132, dml) [gender/ableist language modified with brackets]

When facing these dire warnings regarding the manner in which academic-intellectuals are seduced by power, what prospects exist for parrhesia? How can academic-intellectuals speak “truth to power”? It should be noted, first, that the academic-intellectual’s **primary purpose** should not be to re-create a program to replace power or even to develop a “research program that could be employed by students of world politics,” as Robert Keohane (1989: 173) once advised the legions of the International Studies Association. Because academics are denied the “full truth” from the powerful, Foucault states, we must **avoid a trap** into which governments would want intellectuals to fall (and often they do): “**Put yourself in our place and tell us what you would do**.” This is **not a question** in which one has to answer. To make a decision on any matter requires a knowledge of the facts **refused us**, an analysis of the situation we aren’t allowed to make. There’s the trap. (2001: 453) 27 This means that any alternative order we might provide, this hypothetical “research program of our own,” will also become imbued with authority and **used for mechanisms of control**, a matter I return to in the concluding chapter of this book. When linked to a theme of counterpower, academic-intellectual parrhesia suggests, **instead**, that the academic should use his or her pulpit, their position in society, to be a “friend” “who **plays the role** of a parrhesiastes, of a truth-teller” (2001: 134). 28 When speaking of then-president Lyndon Johnson, Morgenthau gave a bit more dramatic and less amiable take that contained the same sense of urgency. **What the President needs**, then, is an intellectual ~~father~~-confessor, who dares to remind him[/her] of **the brittleness of power**, of its arrogance and ~~blindness~~ [ignorance], of its **limits** and **pitfalls**; who tells him[/her] how empires rise, decline and fall, how power turns to folly, empires to ashes. He[/she] ought to **listen to that voice** and **tremble**. (1970: 28) The primary purpose of the academic-intellectual is therefore not to just effect a moment of counterpower through parrhesia, let alone stimulate that heroic process whereby power realizes the error of its ways. So those who are skeptical that academics ever really, regarding the social sciences, make “that big of a difference” **are missing the point**. As we bear witness to what unfolds in front of us and collectively analyze the testimony of that which happened before us, the purpose of the academic is to “**tell the story**” of what actually happens, to document and faithfully capture both history’s events and context. “The intellectuals of America,” Morgenthau wrote, “can do only one thing: live by the standard of truth that is their peculiar responsibility as intellectuals and by which men of power will ultimately be judged as well” (1970: 28). This will take time, 29 but if this happens, if we seek to uncover and practice telling the truth free from the “**tact**,” “**rules**,” and **seduction** that constrain its telling, then, as Arendt notes, “humanly speaking, no more is required, and **no more can reasonably be asked**, for this planet to remain a place **fit for human habitation**” ([1964] 2006: 233).